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Abstract
We construct an endogenous growth model that includes productive public capital
and government debt. We assume that the government debt-to-GDP ratio is grad-
ually adjusted to a target level, reecting the permanent commitment rules in the
Stability and Growth Pact or the Maastricht Treaty in the EU (i.e., the well-known
60% rule). These rules aect government borrowing and public investment. Here,
we examine the welfare implications of the permanent commitment rules. We nd
that scal consolidation based on the rules improves social welfare. Moreover, the
improvement in welfare accelerates as scal consolidation progresses more rapidly.
Lastly, we also discuss and derive the optimal long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.
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1 Introduction
Government debt has increased in the EU countries since the onset of the 2008{2009
nancial crisis owing to discretionary scal expansion. For example, in Greece, public
debt as a share of GDP equaled 166.1% in 2012, and the country has subsequently suered
severe government nancial failure. The debt-to-GDP ratios in Italy, Ireland, and Portugal
also exceeded 100% in 2012. Since then, many EU member countries have increased their
eorts to implement scal consolidation.
To reduce the risk of such government nancial failure, the EU has implemented the
Maastricht Treaty, which set two types of scal rules that work as permanent constraints
on scal policies. The Maastricht Treaty states that EU member states must keep their
government decit-to-GDP ratio below 3% and their debt-to-GDP ratio below 60%. The
debt reduction benchmark (rule) was introduced by the reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP), the so-called Six-Pack, in December 2011. The rule states that member states
whose current debt-to-GDP ratio is above the 60% threshold must reduce their ratios to
60% by an average rate of one-twentieth per year. We study these scal rules from a
theoretical perspective, focusing in particular on the debt/GDP rules.
These scal rules on government borrowing are related to public investment policies,
because government borrowing is linked directly to public investment, which aects eco-
nomic growth. The IMF (2014) suggests that investment in productive public capital is
important in countries with a high degree of public investment eciency, because the pos-
itive eects of such investments on potential growth are substantially stronger. Bom and
Ligthart (2014) estimate the average output elasticity of public capital, which suggests
that public capital is undersupplied in OECD economies. Indeed, according to plans set
out in the Stability and Convergence Programs (SCPs) in the EU, which were submitted
to the Commission and Council in Spring 2012, the member countries are planning further
scal consolidation based on expenditure cuts, including reductions in public investment.
Thus, it is important that we study how to reduce government debt and create the scal
space for public investment.
Many recent studies consider permanent scal rules and public investment using en-
dogenous growth models. For example, Greiner and Semmler (2000) investigate the long-
run growth eects of public investment policies under decit/GDP rules. Ghosh and
Mourmouras (2004) extend the Greiner and Semmler framework into welfare analysis. In
contrast, Futagami, Iwaisako, and Ohdoi (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013) focus on
debt/GDP rules, under which the government debt relative to the size of the economy is
adjusted gradually to a target level in the long run. These authors show that permanent
scal rules may be important determinants of long-run economic growth and welfare, as
emphasized by Barro (1990).1
Because we focus on the debt/GDP rule, the works of Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea
and Villieu (2013) are more relevant to our study. These authors successfully provide policy
implications of the debt/GDP rule. However, there is still room for discussion. First, they
focus on the current ow of public services rather than the stock of public capital or its
1There is considerable literature on how scal debt policies aect macroeconomic stability, growth, and
welfare in an endogenous growth model. See Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Greiner (2007, 2010, 2012a,
2012b), Yakita (2008b), Arai (2011), Kamiguchi and Tamai (2012), and Teles and Mussolini (2014).
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accumulation.2 Second, they do not derive and discuss an optimal debt-to-GDP ratio.
Third, they do not investigate the welfare eects of debt reduction. Thus, the present
study addresses the following: (i) the eects of the debt/GDP rule on the accumulation of
public capital; (ii) the optimal long-term debt-to-GDP ratio; and (iii) the welfare eects
of debt reduction, including transition dynamics. Further, we pay attention to the pace of
debt reduction (the timeline of debt reduction) because the timeline of a debt adjustment
aects both government borrowing and public investment.
For our purpose, we construct an endogenous growth model that includes public debt
nance, in line with the aforementioned literature. In our model, the growth engine is
productive public capital, as in Futagami et al. (1993) and Turnovsky (1997). Public
capital accumulates through public investment nanced by issuing bonds and taxes on
capital income, labor income, and household consumption. For a government to reduce
its debt to a target level, it must cut spending or increase tax rates. We focus mainly
on the former case, because scal consolidation based only on spending cuts is discussed
widely in the context of many European countries.3 However, we do also briey examine
the latter case because scal consolidation in Spain, Austria, Cyprus, France, Malta, and
Romania is relatively evenly balanced between these two methods.
First, we show that a steady state that is locally saddle stable exists. In contrast to
the models in Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013), our model includes
the possibilities that growth rates become negative and that the no-Ponzi game condition
of the government breaks because we consider the stock of public capital. Thus, we derive
the necessary and sucient condition for strictly positive long-run growth.
Second, we derive the optimal long-term debt-to-GDP ratio. This ratio depends on
the tax rates on wage income and consumption, as well as the share of public investment
in total government spending. Furthermore, we nd that the target debt ratio set by the
SGP and Maastricht Treaty, namely 60%, might be much higher than the optimal level.
Finally, we investigate the welfare eects of debt reduction by considering the tran-
sition dynamics. For these analyses, we calibrate the model to the data of Greece as
an example of a country with a very high debt-to-GDP ratio. In the benchmark case,
where debt reduction is based on expenditure cuts only, reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio
to 60% improves social welfare. This is because debt reduction not only releases resources
to private consumption in the short run, but also creates scal space to increase public
investment in the long run. In addition, we suggest two policy implications. First, the
improvement in welfare increases as the pace of debt reduction increases. Second, lowering
the target debt-to-GDP ratio from 60% to the optimal level increases the improvement in
welfare.
Then, we also examine the welfare eects of debt reduction based on tax increases and
expenditure cuts. In this case, welfare does not always improve. In addition, even when
welfare does improve, the welfare gains are lower than those under expenditure cuts only.
2Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) note that \... it is open to the criticism that insofar as productive
government expenditures are intended to represent public infrastructure, such as roads and education, it
is the accumulated stock, rather than the current ow, that is relevant.".
3The European Commission proposes using spending cuts rather than tax increases for scal consolida-
tion because past evidence indicates that expenditure-based consolidation (spending cuts) tends to have
greater success. According to Public nances in EMU { 2012, on average, the SCPs of both the Euro area
and the EU27 are based primarily on spending cuts. In addition, Greece, whose debt-to-GDP ratio is the
highest in the EU, announced deep spending cuts in their 2011 budget, under IMF and EU supervision.
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This is because although the increases in taxes mitigate the decrease in public investment
in the short run, the negative welfare eects caused by the tax increases become stronger,
mainly owing to their negative eects on savings and consumption growth.
Some scal consolidation strategies are discussed in exogenous growth models, for
example, Coenen et al. (2008), Forni et al. (2010), Papageorgiou (2012), Bi et al. (2013),
Cogan et al. (2013), and Erceg and Linde (2013). These authors focus mainly on the eects
of scal consolidation on transitional dynamics. Then, less normative welfare analyses
of the permanent debt policy rule have been conducted. Our study diers from these
prior studies in the following ways. We consider the long-run growth eects of public
investment that are linked to the permanent debt policy rule. This means that scal
consolidation is part of a long-run objective to balance government borrowing and to
create the scal space for positive expenditure on long-run growth. More importantly, we
investigate welfare analyses with the permanent debt policy rule, and derive and discuss
the long-run optimal debt-to-GDP ratio. Here, we focus on the pace at which consolidation
should be implemented.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 derives the equilibria. Section 4 examines the long-run optimal debt-to-GDP
ratio. Section 5 presents the welfare eects of expenditure-based consolidation. Section 6
introduces an increase in taxes, along with expenditure cuts. Section 7 modies the model
settings and checks the robustness of the results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Our model is based on those of Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013).
Our economy is populated by innitely long-lived representative households who have an
innite planning horizon and perfect foresight. Time is continuous and denoted as t  0.
We assume there is no population growth and that the population size is normalized to
one, as in Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013).
2.1 Production Structure
There is a continuum of competitive rms whose size is normalized to one. Firm j produces
a single nal good using the production technology given by Yj;t = AK

j;t(htLj;t)
1  (0 <
 < 1), where Yj;t, Kj;t, and Lj;t represent the output level, private capital, and labor
input of rm j, respectively. In addition, ht represents the labor productivity at time
t. Through prot maximization, factor prices become equal to the marginal products:
Rt = A(Kj;t=Lj;t)
 1h1 t and wt = (1   )A(Kj;t=Lj;t)h1 t , where Rt and wt denote
the rental price of capital and wage rates, respectively.
Following Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2004) and Yakita (2008a), we assume that the
aggregate private capital, Kt =
P
j Kj;t, and public capital, Kg;t, have positive external
eects on labor productivity, and specify ht = K
1 
t K

g;t ( 2 (0; 1)). Since Kj;t=Lj;t =
Kt=Lt and Lt =
P
j Lj;t hold in equilibrium, the aggregate output and factor prices in
4
period t are written, respectively, as
Yt = Ak

g;tKt; (1a)
Rt = Ak

g;t; (1b)
wt = (1  )Akg;tKt; (1c)
where   (1   ) and kg;t( Kg;t=Kt) is the ratio of public capital to private capital.
Since we have Lt = 1 in equilibrium (as shown later), we omit Lt in the above equations.
2.2 Households
The utility function of a representative household is specied as
U0 =
Z 1
0
C1 t
1  e
 tdt; (2)
where Ct is the household's consumption at time t, and (> 0) and 1= denote the sub-
jective discount rate and intertemporal elasticity of substitution, respectively. Since most
empirical evidence suggests that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively
small, we assume that  > 1. The household inelastically supplies one unit of labor. The
household's budget constraint is given by
_Wt = (1  r;t)rtWt + (1  w;t)wt   (1 + c;t)Ct; (3)
where Wt denotes assets, rt is the interest rate, c;t( 0) is the consumption tax rate, and
r;t(w;t) 2 [0; 1) is the interest (labor) income tax rate. Taking rt, wt, r;t, w;t, and c;t
as given, the household maximizes (2) subject to (3), which yields the Euler equation and
the transversality condition:
_Ct =
1


(1  r;t)rt     _c;t
1 + c;t

Ct; (4a)
lim
t!1
C t Wt exp ( t) = 0: (4b)
2.3 Government
The government imposes taxes on income and consumption, and issues bonds, Bt, to
nance public expenditure, Gt. We restrict our attention to the case of Gt > 0. The
budget constraint of the government is
_Bt = rtBt +Gt   (r;trtWt + w;twt + c;tCt); (5)
where Bt represents the government's outstanding debt and _Bt denotes newly issued gov-
ernment bonds. The government constraint must satisfy the no-Ponzi game condition,
limt!1Bt exp[ 
R t
0
rvdv] = 0:
4 A constant fraction,  2 (0; 1), of Gt is used for public
capital investment, Ig;t, that is, Gt = Ig;t. The evolution of public capital is given by
_Kg;t = Ig   gKg;t = Gt   gKg;t; (6)
4It is well known that this no-Ponzi game condition of the government becomes equivalent to the
household's transversality condition in the steady state.
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where g 2 (0; 1) is the depreciation of public capital. In Section 7, we briey discuss the
case in which households derive their utility from public services, Cg;t  (1  )Gt, which
is not considered in the benchmark model.
Following Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013), we assume that the
government adjusts its bonds gradually to the target level. Let us dene bt  Bt=Yt and
assume that the government adjusts bt according to the following rule:
_bt =  (bt   b); (7)
where b and (> 0) denote the target level of government bonds and the adjustment
coecient of the rule, respectively. We consider the case of b > 0. If bt is larger than b,
the government has to reduce its debt according to the dierence between the current and
target levels of b: bt   b. If the adjustment coecient, , takes a large (small) value, the
government adjusts bt to the target level at a fast (slow) pace. This policy rule indicates
the long-run commitment of the SGP debt reduction benchmark, reformed in 2011, under
which member states whose current debt-to-GDP ratio is above the 60% threshold must
reduce their ratio 60% (see the second paragraph of the introduction).5 Our investigation
focuses on the rule that the SGP expects.
The benchmark model considers scal consolidation based on expenditure cuts, and
the government sets constant tax rates, r;t = r, w;t = w, and c;t = c. Then, gt varies so
that it satises (5) and (7). This is because, according to Public nances in EMU { 2012,
the consolidations set out in the SCPs for both the Euro area and the EU27 are based
primarily on expenditure cuts. In contrast, in Spain, Austria, Cyprus, France, Malta, and
Romania, scal consolidation is relatively evenly balanced between spending cuts and tax
increases, and is primarily tax-based in Belgium and Italy. Therefore, we examine scal
consolidation based on both expenditure cuts and tax increases in Section 6.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Dynamic System
The labor market equilibrium condition is Lt = 1. The asset market clears asWt = Kt+Bt.
Let us assume that private capital depreciates at the rate k 2 (0; 1), where the interest
rate is rt = Rt  k.6 Substituting these into (5) and using (1a), (1b), and (1c), we obtain
_Bt = (1  r)(Rt   k)Bt   (~Yt + cC  Gt) + rkKt; (8)
where ~  r + (1  )w. The goods market equilibrium condition is given by
_Kt = Yt   Ct  Gt   kKt: (9)
5Such a policy rule would not expect uncertain scal policy behavior such as policy regime changes.
However, there may be some discussion on uncertain scal consolidation, as studied by Bi et al. (2013).
There may also be other discussions on the rule. For example, recent high-debt countries that are in the
process of reducing their debt can have diculty obeying the rule in the short run because of the adverse
eects that contractionary scal policies and the increase in the interest payment have on GDP.
6This is because, by the no-arbitrage argument in the asset market, government bonds have the same
rate of return as capital.
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Let us dene ct  Ct=Kt and gt  Gt=Kt. The denition of bt implies _bt = _Bt=Yt  
( _Yt=Yt)bt. Substituting (1a), (1b), (7), and (8) into this expression, we obtain
_bt =  (bt   b) =
"
(1  r)
n
Akg;t   k
o
 
_Yt
Yt
#
bt   ~   c ct
Akg;t
+
gt
Akg;t
+
rk
Akg;t
: (10)
Using (1a), (6), and (9), we obtain
_kg;t = ( + kg;t)gt   Ak1+g;t + ctkg;t + (k   g)kg;t: (11)
From Yt = Ak

g;tKt, (9), and (11), we derive the GDP growth rate as
_Yt
Yt
= 
_kg;t
kg;t
+ Akg;t   ct   gt   k = (1  )(Akg;t   ct   k)  [(1  )kg;t   ]
gt
kg;t
  g:
(12)
Substituting (12) into (10), and solving for gt, we obtain
gt =
 (bt; ct; kg;t)  bt(Akg;t)2   (bt   b)Akg;t + (1  )(Akg;t   ct)Akg;tbt   (g   k)Akg;tbt
1 + [(1  )kg;t   ] btAk 1g;t
 g(bt; ct; kg;t); (13)
where  (bt; ct; kg;t)  [~ + r(Akg;t   k)bt]Akg;t + cct   rk. The numerator on the
right-hand side (RHS) of (13) represents the components of gt. The rst term  (bt; ct; kg;t)
is the tax revenue of the government. The second term represents the interest payment
on government debt. The third term shows that, given bt, if the government reduces b,
public spending must fall in the short run. When  is larger, the short-run decreases in gt
are also larger because the government must reduce its debt more rapidly, and hence its
budget becomes tight. We call this eect of  the timeline eect. The fourth term implies
that a high growth of Yt has a positive eect on public spending.
7 The last is the term
related to depreciation.
Substituting _c = 0 and (1b) into (4a), and using (1a), (9), and (13), we obtain
_ct =

ct + g(bt; ct; kg;t) 

1  1

(1  r)

Akg;t  


+

1  1  r


k

ct: (14)
Using (1a), (6), (9), and (13), we then have
_kg;t = ( + kg;t)g(bt; ct; kg;t)  Ak1+g;t + ctkg;t + (k   g)kg;t: (15)
Equations (7), (14), and (15), together with the initial values, kg;0 and b0, and the transver-
sality condition, (4b), characterize the dynamics of the economy.
7The goods market equilibrium condition, (9), shows that, given Gt, when Ak

g;t   ct becomes large,
the growth rate of private capital rises. When Kt grows at a high rate, Yt tends to grow more quickly. In
this case, the government requires relatively little eort to reduce bt  Bt=Yt to b. Then, a large increase
in Yt enables the government to increase gt.
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3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
This subsection derives the steady-state equilibrium in which ct, kg;t, and bt become con-
stant over time. We omit the time index, t, from the variables that become constant over
time in the steady state. Setting _ct = 0, _kg;t = 0, and bt = b in (14) and (15), we obtain
c + g =

1  1

(1  r)

A(kg)
 +


 

1  1  r


k (16)
c = A(kg)
  

1 +

kg

g   (k   g): (17)
We use an asterisk to represent a steady-state variable. From (16) and (17), we obtain
g =
(1  r)A(kg)1+   [+ (1  r)k   g]kg

: (18)
From (1b) and (4a), we derive the long-run growth rate,  = _Ct=Ct = _Kt=Kt = _Kg;t=Kg;t:
 =
1


(1  r)

A(kg)
   k
	   : (19)
Then, we have  > 0 if and only if kg > [f+ (1  r)kg=f(1  r)Ag]
1
  kg;.
Using (17), (19),  = _Kt=Kt = _Kg;t=Kg;t, and bt = b, we can rearrange (10) as


1 + c

1 +

kg

g = !(kg)A(k

g)
   (k   g)c   rk; (20)
where !(kg)  (1  )(1  r)bA(kg) + (~ + c)  [(1  )(1  r)k + ]b. Substituting
(18) into (20), we obtain



(kg)Ak

g + 

= (1 + c)kg

(1  r)Akg   f+ (1  r)kg+ g

; (21)
where 
(kg)  !(kg)  c(1  r) and   cf+(1  r)kg (c+ r)k. This equation
determines kg . Substituting k

g into (17), we obtain c
. Let us denote the RHS and the
left-hand side (LHS) of (21) as (kg) and (kg), respectively. Appendices A and B prove
the next proposition.
Proposition 1
Suppose that (kyg) > (k
y
g) and (A.5) or (A.6) are satised, where k
y
g, (A.5), and (A.6)
are dened in Appendix A. There exists a locally saddle-stable steady state where we have
 > 0 and the no-Ponzi game condition of the government is satised.
In contrast to the models in Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013), our
model includes the possibilities that the growth rates become negative and the no-Ponzi
game condition of the government breaks in the long run. This is because we consider the
stock of public capital rather than the ow of public services. A sucient public capital
8
accumulation is needed to sustain a large government debt. Conditions (A.5) or (A.6)
ensure such a public capital accumulation.8
Next, we examine the long-run eects of reductions in b. Appendix C proves the
following proposition.
Proposition 2
A decrease in the target debt ratio, b, promotes economic growth and increases public
expenditure in the long run. That is, dkg=db < 0, d
=db < 0, and dg=db < 0.
The intuition behind these policy eects is simple. As b decreases, outstanding public
debt reduces in the long run. The government's interest payments also reduce, which
loosens its budget constraint and creates scal space to increase public investment. In
the long run, g increases and, hence, the long-run growth rate increases. Note that in
the short run, decreases in b reduce g (see (13)). However, as bt decreases to b, the
government's interest payment steadily decreases, which means it can gradually increase
public expenditure. The next subsection examines the transitional eects of reductions in
b.
3.3 Transitional Dynamics
Here, we examine the eects of b on the transition path and show that these eects depend
heavily on the timeline eect of , which has no eect in the long run.
We consider the following scenario: the economy is initially in the steady state with
b = binit, where binit denotes the initial level of b. Then, we have b0 = binit. At time 0, the
government reduces b from binit to bnew unexpectedly, where bnew is the level of b after the
policy change. Then, the economy begins to move toward the new steady state.
Parameter Values
The complexity of the model does not allow us to obtain an analytical solution. Thus, we
conduct a numerical analysis. The debt-to-GDP ratio in the new steady state, bnew, is set
to 0.6 following the target debt ratio in the SGP and the Maastricht Treaty. We use the
following ve values of :  = 0:01; 0:025; 0:05; 0:075; 0:1. The other parameter values are
chosen based on the data of Greece (see Appendix D) as an example of a country with
a very high debt-to-GDP ratio. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values. Under these
parameter values, we calculate the values of the consumption-to-GDP ratio (C0=Y0), the
total capital-to-GDP ratio ((K0+Kg;0)=Y0), and the ratio of tax revenue to output in the
initial steady state (see Appendix D). Table 2 compares these calculations with the data
averages in Greece for the period 2000{2008.9 Since the initial steady state of the model is
8Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis (2008) also assess the possibility of a negative long-run growth rate in
an endogenous growth model of productive public capital in Proposition 1 on pages 3766{3767. With the
depreciations of public and private capital, they show that the government should be cautious in using
scarce public expenditure to maintain the public capital that sustains the economic growth. However,
rather than government borrowing, they consider a balanced budget. In our model, we would rather put
a caveat on huge government debt that hinges on sustainable economic growth.
9The data average for the capital-to-GDP ratio is based on the AMECO database. The data average
for tax revenue is based on the OECD Revenue Statistics.
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in line with the data, it is a reasonable starting point for our policy experiments. Finally,
note that the long-run growth rate in the initial steady state takes a positive value under
the (parameter) values in Table 1, namely init = 0:035 (see Appendix D), and then (A.5)
or (A.6) in Proposition 1 is satised. Reductions in b also satisfy either of them in the
long run because of Proposition 2.
[Tables 1 and 2]
Eects of Reductions in b on Transitional Dynamics
Here, we analyze the transition paths numerically using the relaxation algorithm.10 Panel
(a) in Figure 1 shows that the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases monotonically toward its new
steady-state value. As  increases, the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases at a higher rate.
[Figure 1]
Just after the policy change, the ratio of public investment to output, Ig;t=Yt, drops
sharply (see Panel (b)). To reduce bt, the government must initially reduce its expenditure,
as shown by the term (bt   b) in (13). However, as bt steadily declines, the interest
payments on government debt gradually decrease, which loosens the government's budget
constraint and creates scal space to increase public investment. Then, Ig;t=Yt gradually
increases and eventually exceeds the initial level (see the last paragraph in subsection 3.2).
For larger values of , the initial drops in Ig;t=Yt are also larger because the government
must cut a larger amount of its expenditure to reduce its debt at a higher rate. Higher
values of  also mean that it takes less time for Ig;t=Yt to recover its initial level.
Panel (c) shows that the growth rate of private capital, Kt, jumps just after the policy
change because the decline in public expenditure (investment) releases resources to the
private sector. Then, it gradually decreases to its new steady-state value.
The dynamics of public investment and private capital drive those of kg;t. During the
early stage of the transition, kg;t gradually decreases because of the reductions in Ig;t=Yt
and the increases in Kt. However, as Ig;t=Yt gradually increases, kg;t begins to increase,
eventually exceeding its initial level in the long run. Since the growth rate of consumption
is a function of kg;t (see (1b) and (4a)), it decreases during the early stage of the transition,
but then begins to increase in the latter stages, eventually exceeding its initial level (see
Panel (d)). As  increases, the decline in the growth rate of consumption in the early stage
of the transition is large, whereas it also takes less time until the growth rate recovers its
initial level. The Euler equation (4a) shows that the interest rate exhibits the transition
path similar to that of the growth rate of consumption.11
Panel (e) provides the transitional paths of ct. From this panel, we know the eects of
the policy change on the initial consumption level, C0, because C0  c0K0. For all values
10Trimborn et al. (2008) detail the relaxation algorithm. They also provide MAT-
LAB programs for the relaxation algorithm, freely downloadable at http://www.wiwi.uni-
siegen.de/vwli/forschung/relaxation/the relaxation method.html?lang=de.
11The real interest rate becomes somewhat larger than the standard level. This comes from the simple
setting of the model where capital inow is absent. If one carefully examines this situation in the real
world, huge models that incorporate the capital market in the open economy and the exchange rates and
other scal and monetary policies in each of the countries might be necessary. However, this is beyond the
scope of this study. Here, we investigate those eects that are essential to social welfare and an optimal
target debt ratio, which have received less attention. Thus, our discussion restricts the movement of the
real interest rate.
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of , C0 jumps just after the policy change because the decline in public expenditure
(investment) releases resources to the private sector. As  increases, these crowding-in
eects become stronger and the initial increase in C0 becomes large.
4 Optimal Debt-to-GDP Ratio
In the SGP or the Maastricht Treaty, the target debt-to-GDP ratio is set at 60%. However,
this level might be dierent from the optimal level. This section examines the long-run
optimal debt-to-GDP ratio that can attain the rst-best welfare maximizing allocation.
The long-run optimal debt-to-GDP ratio can be derived by considering the optimal scal
policy in the steady state. To this end, we solve a social planner's problem.
Distortions from the following external eects exist in this economy: the positive ex-
ternal eect of Kt and that of Kg;t (see Yj;t = AK

j;t(htLj;t)
1  and ht = K1 t K

g;t in
Subsection 2.1). Therefore, the decentralized economy cannot attain a rst-best alloca-
tion in the long run. To attain the optimum allocation, the following scal policies are
required. First, the capital income tax rate r is needed to remove the distortion from the
external eect of Kt. Second, the other policy instruments, c, w, , and b, are needed to
remove the external eects of Kg;t.
A social planner maximizes the household's discounted lifetime utility, subject to the
economy's aggregate resource constraints, (6) and (9). Because Gt = Ig;t (see (6)) and
(1a), the resource constraint (9) can be rewritten as
_Kt = AK

g;tK
1 
t    1Ig;t   Ct   kKt: (22)
The social planner maximizes (2), subject to (6) and (22) with respect to Ct, Ig;t, Kt, and
Kg;t. From the rst-order conditions, we obtain
_Ct
Ct
=
1

h
(1  )Akg;t   k   
i
; (23)
(1  )Akg   k = Ak 1g   g: (24)
The condition (24) indicates that the marginal product of private capital is equal to that
of public capital. The LHS of (24) is monotonically increasing in kg, whereas the RHS is
monotonically decreasing in kg. Then, k
opt
g is uniquely determined. Substituting (24) into
(23), we obtain the following optimal long-run growth rate of consumption:
opt =
1


(1  )A(koptg )   k   

: (25)
The government in the decentralized economy chooses the target debt ratio, b, to replicate
the rst-best outcome in the long run.
Let us compare the corresponding relationships (21) and (19) with (24) and (25). The
steady-state equilibrium will replicate the rst-best optimum: kg = k
opt
g and 
 = opt if
and only if
1   optr =
(1  )A(koptg )   k
A(koptg )   k
; (26)
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and



(koptg )A(k
opt
g )
 + 

= (1 + c)k
opt
g

(1   optr )A(koptg )   f+ (1   optr )kg+ g

:
(27)
Recall that  = (1   ). Condition (26) shows that  optr < 0 when 0   < 1, whereas
 optr = 0 when  = 1. The former result corresponds to the usual policy implication
that subsidies on capital are required to remove the external eects of Kt (see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004), pp 216-217). On the other hand, the latter case corresponds to a
manifestation of the well-known result of Chamley (1986) that capital should be untaxed
when there are no externalities from Kt.
From (26) and (27), we obtain the optimal target debt ratio as follows:
bopt =
 1(1 + c)koptg

(1   optr )A(koptg )   f+ (1   optr )kg+ g
  
(1  )(1   optr )A(koptg )   [(1  )(1   optr )k + ]
	
A(koptg )
+
c(1   optr )  (~ + c)
(1  )(1   optr )A(koptg )   [(1  )(1   optr )k + ]
: (28)
In the case of the parameter set in Table 1: (1 ;A; ; ; ; ; k; g)=(0.5645, 0.4650,
0.0345, 2.5, 0.0412, 0.1590, 0.028, 0.031), we obtain (koptg ; 
opt
r ) = (0:0056; 1:4567).
Figure 2 shows the relationship between bopt and the set of tax rates (c; w). When
(c; w)=(0.1293, 0.2818), as in Table 1, b
opt is in the region of a negative value. Only
when both c and w are suciently high do we have b
opt > 0.
[Figure 2]
To simplify the discussion, we consider the case of no depreciation in both private
and public capital (k = g = 0). In this case, we obtain k
opt
g = =(1   ) and  optr =
( +    1)= from (24) and (26). Therefore, (28) reduces to
bopt =
[~ + (   1)c   ]A


1 

+ (c+)
1 
(   1)(1  )A


1 

+ 

A


1 
 ; (29)
where ~  (1   )w +  +    1. Because  > 1 is assumed, bopt is obviously increasing
in both w and c. After some calculation, we can easily show @b
opt=@ < 0 when bopt > 0.
Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3
If the depreciation of both private and public capital are zero, we have
(i) @
bopt
@w
> 0 and @
bopt
@w
> 0, and (ii)@
bopt
@
< 0, when bopt > 0.
The intuitive explanation of this policy implication is simple. When tax revenue is su-
ciently large, the government's debt nance can become positive as the optimal decision.
On the other hand, an increase in  promotes public investment and leads to a rise in kg ,
which increases the interest rate of government debt. In order to reduce the cost of this
interest payment, the planner decreases bopt in the long run.
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5 Welfare Analysis: Expenditure Cuts Only
Focusing only on the steady state, we obtain the long-run optimal debt-to-GDP ratio in
the previous section. To conduct a complete welfare analysis of debt reduction, we have
to fully consider the transitional dynamics. We consider the same scenario as that in
Subsection 3.3.
Our welfare measure is (2). Using Ct = C0 exp[
R t
0
C;vdv], where C;t( [(1 r)fAkg;t 
kg   ]=) is the growth rate of consumption, we rewrite (2) as
U0 =
C1 0
1  
Z 1
0
exp

(1  )
Z t
0
C;vdv   t

dt:
This equation shows that decreases in b aect the welfare level through their eects on
C0 = c0K0 and the paths of C;t. Because the eects of the policy change on C0 and the
transitional paths of C;t depend heavily on the timeline eect of , as we observed in
Subsection 3.3, the welfare eects of reductions in b are also inuenced by .
We examine the welfare eects numerically using the relaxation algorithm. The initial
steady state is the same as that considered in Subsection 3.3. Again, we consider ve
values of : 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, and 0.1. The case in which  = 0:05 matches the debt
reduction benchmark introduced by the SGP (see the introduction).
Let us denote the welfare level without the policy change as U0;N  (cNK0)1 =f(1 
)[   C;N(1   )]g, where cN and C;N are the initial steady-state values of c and C ,
respectively. To calculate U0;N , we set K0 = 1. The welfare level immediately after the
policy change is denoted as U0 . Appendix E presents the calculation procedure. The
welfare gains (losses) of the policy change are measured by U0  (U0   U0;N)=jU0;N j.
Results
The second column in Table 3 provides the long-run growth rates of the new steady states.
Because the growth rate in the initial steady state is 0.035, debt reduction increases the
long-run growth rate, as shown in Proposition 2. However, the growth eect is rather
modest. This reects the small elasticity of output with respect to public capital,  =
(1  ) = 0:0345.12
[Table 3]
The row labeled as C0 represents percentage changes in the initial consumption levels.
As discussed in Subsection 3.3, as  increases, the initial increases in C0 become large.
With regard to the welfare eects, Table 3 reveals the following results: (i) for all
values of , a reduction of b to 60% improves welfare; and (ii) as  increases, welfare
improvements become large. This is because when  is larger, more resources are released
to the private sector and, hence, the initial increases in C0 become large.
If the consumption growth rate remains constant at the initial rate, how much of an
increase in initial consumption is required to attain the same level of welfare improve-
ments as that of U0? The row labeled as Cequiv shows the required increases in initial
12Bom and Ligthart (2014) estimate that the average output elasticity of public capital amounts to
0.106 if we consider OECD countries. Such a large output elasticity of public capital can bring about the
larger long-run growth eect of debt reductions.
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consumption. In all cases, Cequiv is smaller than C0. This indicates that the decline in
the consumption growth rate during the early stage of the transition has a strong negative
welfare eect. However, C0 is large enough to counteract this negative eect.
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that by setting the target level, bnew, to zero, welfare
improves even further. This is because the long-run optimal target debt ratio is smaller
than 0.6 under the parameter sets of Table 1 (see the statements below Eq. (28) in Section
4).
6 Expenditure Cuts with Tax Increases
Thus far, we have discussed debt reductions based only on expenditure cuts because the
consolidations set out in the SCPs for both the Euro area and the EU27 are primarily
based on this method, according to the Public nances in EMU { 2012 (See footnote 3
in the introduction). The goal of this section is to compare the welfare eects between
debt reductions based only on expenditure cuts and those based on both expenditure
cuts and tax increases. This is motivated by the following points. As noted earlier, in
countries such as Spain, Austria, Cyprus, France, Malta, and Romania, consolidations are
relatively evenly spread between expenditure cuts and tax increases. If the government
could increase tax rates when attempting to decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio, the reductions
in public investment just after the policy change might be mitigated. Therefore, with tax
increases, the eects of debt reductions might be dierent from those examined thus far.
We assume that the government unexpectedly increases tax rates at the same time
as it decreases b. See Appendix F for more details. From then on, the tax rates remain
unchanged because, in practice, frequent changes in tax rates might be dicult to im-
plement politically. We denote increases in the rates of interest income, labor income,
and consumption taxes as r, w, and c, respectively. We assume that only one tax
rate is changed, while the other two rates remain unchanged. We choose values of r,
w, and c so that the ratio of tax revenue to output in the new steady state becomes
larger than that in the initial steady state by x(= 0; 1; 2; 3)%. Naturally, x = 0 implies
r = w = c = 0.
We use the same parameter values as in the previous sections. Figure 3 shows the
transitional dynamics under bnew = 0:6 and  = 0:05. The solid lines represent debt
reductions without any tax increases (x = 0). The panels in the rst column present the
results obtained when only r is increased. The eects of increases in w and c are shown
in the second and last columns, respectively.
As x becomes larger, the initial decline in the ratio of public investment to output is
mitigated (see Panels (a)-1, (b)-1, and (c)-1). Panels (a)-2, 3, and 4 show that because
increases in r have a negative distortionary eect on households' saving, the growth rates
of private capital and consumption decrease signicantly and the initial increases in private
consumption become larger. Panels (b)-2 and (c)-2 show that an increase in either w or
c reduces the early increase in the growth rate of Kt. Panels (b)-4 and (c)-4 further show
that the initial increases in C0 are lower. This is because more resources are devoted to
public investment as a result of the tax increases. Panels (b)-3 and (c)-3 show that when
either w or c increase, the decreases in the growth rate of consumption in the early stage
are mitigated because increased public investments have a positive eect on the interest
14
rate.
Table 4 presents the welfare eects. The results without a tax increase are presented
in the row labeled \Benchmark." With a tax increase, the welfare gains from the debt
reduction are depressed and, in many cases, welfare deteriorates. In all cases, the debt
reduction based only on expenditure cuts generates the largest welfare gains. As shown in
Panel (a)-3 in Figure 3, an increase in r has a large and negative distortionary eect on
the consumption growth rate, which has a signicant negative welfare eect. When either
w or c increase, there is less of an initial increase in C0, which decreases the negative
welfare eects.13
[Figure 3 and Table 4]
7 Extension of the Model: Government Consumption
into Utility
Thus far, we have assumed that government consumption expenditure, Cg;t  (1   )Gt,
which accounts for a large part of government spending, is not valued by households.
Reductions in b initially have a negative eect on Cg;t. Hence, if households derive their
utility from Cg;t, the initial welfare loss becomes larger and a reduction in b might have
a negative welfare eect. Incorporating government consumption into utility may be an
important modication.
However, if we assume non-separability between utilities from private and government
consumption, based on the empirical ndings of Ni (1995), equilibrium indeterminacy
may arise.14 The multiplicity of equilibrium paths makes it dicult to investigate the
welfare eects. If the utility function takes a separable form with respect to Ct and Cg;t,
equilibrium indeterminacy never arises. Then, we consider the following utility function:
U0 =
Z 1
0

C1 t
1   +  ln(Cg;t)

e tdt; (30)
where  is a positive constant and Cg;t  (1 )Gt denotes government consumption. This
modication has no inuence on the dynamic system of the economy and the steady state.
The results thus far, except those regarding welfare eects, hold perfectly, even under this
modication.
Using the same parameter values as in Subsections 3.3 and Section 5 and considering
the same scenario as in Section 5, we conduct a welfare analysis of reductions in b for
several values of  .15 Table 5 presents U0  (U0   U0;N)=jU0;N j, where U0 denotes
the utility just after the policy change, and U0;N denotes the utility in the initial steady
state (as earlier).16 Table 5 also shows the results obtained under  = 0, which are
13Note that w and c do not distort households' behaviors. However, they aect public investments
through the government budget constraint and the debt rule (see (13).).
14Using a model with utility-generating government consumption, Guo and Harrison (2008) show that
equilibrium indeterminacy arises under a balanced budget.
15Since this modication has no eect on the dynamic system and the steady-state equilibrium, the
initial and new steady states are the same as in Subsection 3.3 and Section 5 under the same parameter
values.
16See Appendix E for the calculation of U0 .
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naturally the same as those in Table 3. Even under this modication, the reductions in b
improve welfare for all values of  and bnew, and these improvements in welfare increase
as  increases and bnew decreases.
If the government increases tax rates, as described in Section 6, the reductions in b
might have dierent welfare eects if  > 0, because tax increases mitigate the negative
eects on Cg;t. Assuming  = 0:5, we conduct the same policy experiment as in Section 6
and present the results in Table 6. The table shows that, even when households place a high
value on government consumption ( = 0:5), debt reductions based only on expenditure
cuts generate the largest positive welfare gains in all cases.
[Tables 5 and 6]
8 Conclusion
Following Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013), we considered a simple
debt policy rule in an endogenous growth model. Under the policy rule, the government
gradually reduces its debt to the target level. Departing from these two studies, we
investigate (i) the eects of the debt policy rule on the accumulation of public capital,
(ii) the optimal target debt ratio in the long run, and (iii) the welfare analysis of the debt
reduction that fully considers the transition dynamics. We obtained the following results.
1. A steady state that is locally saddle stable exists. However, in contrast to the
models in Futagami et al. (2008) and Minea and Villieu (2013), our model includes
the possibilities that the growth rates become negative and that the no-Ponzi game
condition of the government breaks in the long run. This result occurs because we
consider the stock of public capital rather than the ow of public services.
2. The optimal target debt ratio is uniquely determined. The ratio depends on the tax
rates on wage income and consumption, as well as the share of public investment in
total government spending. The target debt ratio set by the SGP and Maastricht
Treaty, namely 60%, might be higher than the optimal level.
3. Debt reduction based only on expenditure cuts improves welfare. As the pace of
debt reduction increases, welfare improves further. Second, lowering the target debt
ratio of 60% to the optimal level increases the improvement in welfare.
4. Under scal consolidation based on expenditure cuts with a tax increase, welfare
does not always improve. Even when welfare does improve, the welfare gains are
lower than those under expenditure cuts only.
5. Even when households derive their utility from public services, the above results
hold.
There remain areas for further study. First, we do not consider the heterogeneity
of agents. Bastagli et al. (2012) discuss how some governments may increase the top
marginal income tax rates and avoid the decrease in redistributive transfers during scal
consolidation periods. Incorporating the heterogeneity of agents may be an interesting
extension. Second, we do not consider intergenerational conicts. Expenditure cuts or tax
16
increases may worsen the welfare of the current generation. However, if the consolidation
is not conducted appropriately, the burden on future generations may increase. Therefore,
incorporating intergenerational conicts remains for future research. Third, some policy
shifts after a debt reduction would remain as an important policy issue. For example, the
government could use the policy space created by the debt reduction to decrease tax rates.
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Appendix
A Proof of Propositions 1-(a): Existence of the Steady State
The rst and second derivatives of (kg) (the RHS of (21)) are
0(kg) = (1 + c)

(1  r)(1 + )Akg   f+ (1  r)kg+ g

; (A.1)
00(kg) = (1 + c)(1 + )(1  r)Ak 1g > 0: (A.2)
Therefore, (kg) is a convex and strictly increasing (decreasing) function of kg for kg  (<
)[1=(1+)]
1
 kg, where kg  [1  g=f+ (1  r)kg]
1
 kg;. Note that kg 
h
1  g
+(1 r)k
i 1

kg; =h
+(1 r)k g
(1 r)A
i 1

and kg < kg;. If 1 > g=f + (1   r)kg, (kg) is equal to zero both
when kg = 0 and kg = kg  [1  g=f+ (1  r)kg]
1
 kg;. On the other hand, if
1  g=f + (1  r)kg, (kg) is equal to zero only when kg = 0. Figures 4 and 5 show
that (kg) is a convex function of kg.
[Figures 4 and 5]
Next, we consider the properties of (kg) (the LHS of (21)). Seemingly, we have
(0) = . The rst derivative of (kg) is
0(kg) = Ak 1g
 2(   1)(1  r)bAkg +  ; (A.3)
where   (~ + c)  [(1  )(1  r)k + ]b  c(1  r). If  > 0, 0(kg) < (=) > 0 if
and only if kg > (=) < ~kg. If  < 0, 
0(kg) < 0 for kg  0. The second derivative of (kg)
is
00(kg) = Ak 2g
 2(2   1)(   1)(1  r)bAkg + (   1) : (A.4)
If  > 0, 00(kg) has the following properties. When 12   < 1, 00(kg) < 0 holds for all
kg( 0). When 0 <  < 12 , 00(kg)  0 holds for 0 < kg < ~kg  kg  [(1 )=(1 2)]1=~kg,
and 00(kg) > 0 for kg > kg. If  < 0, the following properties holds for 00(kg). When
1
2
  < 1, 00(kg) > 0 holds for 0 < kg  kg, and 00(kg)  0 for kg > kg.
In summary, (kg) has the following properties. When  > 0, (kg) is an increasing
and concave function for kg < ~kg  [=f2(  1)(1  r)bAg]
1
 , while it decreases with kg
for kg > ~kg (see Figure 4). On the other hand, when   0, (kg) becomes monotonically
decreasing for kg > 0 (see Figure 5).
A steady state E always exists if and only if (kyg) > (k
y
g), where k
y
g is the value of
kg(< k

g) that satises 
0(kg) = 0(kg). Appendix B shows that this steady state is saddle
stable.17 Then, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, this steady state value kg satises 
 > 0 if
and only if (kg;) > (kg;) or 
0(kg;) > 0(kg;) when (kg;) < (kg;). That is,
+ (1  r)k
(1  r)A < ; (A.5)
17It is possible that another steady state in which kg < k

g exists if  < 0 (see Figures 4 and 5). Let us
denote the value of kg in this steady state as kg;low. We nd that this steady state is unstable in Appendix
B. Therefore, we nd that the economy converges to the saddle stable economy kg if kg;0 > kg;low.
Nevertheless, if kg;0 < kg;low, the economy can fail to develop, in which case the government in the
economy with low public capital should avoid the scal policy of  < 0.
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or
 <
+ (1  r)k
(1  r)A <  when
+ (1  r)k
(1  r)A > ; (A.6)
where
 
(


(~ + c   b)f+ (1  r)kg   (1  r)(c + r)k

(1  r)(1 + c)g
)
;
 

A[   2(   1)f+ (1  r)kgb]
(1 + c)[f+ (1  r)kg+ g]
 
1 
:
Under (A.5) or (A.6), the conventional transversality condition (no-Ponzi game condition
of the government): (1  ) <  for  > 1 is satised in the long run because of  > 0.
Both  and  are decreasing in b. Then, the government can break the scal balance in
the long run if b is large enough to break (A.5) or (A.6).
B Proof of Proposition 1-(b): Stability of the Steady State
Approximating (7), (14), and (15) linearly around the steady states, we obtain0@ _b_c
_kg
1A =
0@  0 0Jcb Jcc Jckg
Jkgb Jkgc Jkgkg
1A0@ bt   bct   c
kgt   kg
1A : (B.1)
Then, J = (Jij) denotes the coecient matrix of the former system:
Jcb =g1(b; c
; kg)c
; Jcc = (1 + g2(b; c; kg))c
;
Jckg =
"
g3(b; c
; kg) 
[   (1  r)]A(kg) 1

#
c;
Jkgb =( + k

g)g1(
b; c; kg); Jkgc = ( + k

g)g2(
b; c; kg) + k

g ;
Jkgkg =g
 + ( + kg)g3(b; c
; kg)  (1 + )A(kg) + c + k   g: (B.2)
The structure of the rst column of J means that one of the eigenvalues of J is  < 0. The
remaining two eigenvalues of J are those of the matrix J , derived by deleting the rst row
and column from J . To check for stability, we examine the sign of det J = JccJkgkg JkgcJckg .
Using (B.2) with (17), (18), and (21), we obtain
det J =
c	(kg)
1 +

(1  )kg   
	
bA(kg) 1


;
where
	(kg) A(kg) 1

2(1  )(1  r)bA(kg) + 

  (1 + c)

(1  r)(1 + )A(kg)   f+ (1  r)kg+ g

:
If we use 0(kg) and 
0(kg), the above equation can be rewritten as
det J =
c
1 +

(1  )kg   
	
bA(kg) 1



0(kg)  0(kg)

:
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Figure 4 shows that in the steady state E, 0(kg) < 
0(kg) holds and, hence, det J < 0.
One of the eigenvalues of J is positive and the other is negative. Then, the steady state is
locally saddle-point stable. When  < 0, another steady state in which kg = kg;low can exist
(see footnote 17). However, this steady state is unstable because 0(kg;low) > 0(kg;low)
holds and, hence, det J > 0.
C Proof of Proposition 2
From the LHS of (21), the magnitude of the shift in (kg) when b increases is A(k

g)
[(1 
)   ]. Because  > 1, it takes a negative value for  > 0. Thus, when b falls, (kg)
shifts upward, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. As a result, kg increases. Then, the long-run
growth rate, , increases (see (19)). Using (6) and the denitions of g, kg, and , we have
that g = ( + g)kg . Reductions in b unambiguously increase g
. Thus, Proposition 2
holds.
D Parameter Values
We choose parameter values using the data of Greece. The labor income share is computed
from the EU KLEMS database using data of labor compensation and gross value added,
which yield an average labor income share of 56.43% in the period 2000{2007.18 Thus, we
set 1   = 0:5643. According to the AMECO database, the average ratio of government
expenditure (including public investment) to GDP is 0.2170 in the period 2000{2008.19
During the same period, the average ratio of public investment to GDP is 0.0345. Since we
have  = public investment/government expenditure, we set  = 0:1590(= 0:0345=0:2170),
which means that investment by the government amounts to 15.9% of its total expenditure.
Following Baxter and King (1993), the elasticity of output with respect to public capital
is set to the ratio of public investment to GDP, namely   (1   ) = 0:0345, which
yields  = 0:0611. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1=, is set to 0.4. Following
Kollintzas amd Vassilatos (2000), we set k = 0:028 and g = 0:031. These depreciation
rates are consistent with those of Papageorgiou (2012).
We calculate the tax rates based on a modied version of the methodology proposed
by Mendoza et al. (1994), as described in Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) in paragraphs
16{28, which yields average tax rates for 2000{2008 in Greece as r = 0:2178, w = 0:2818,
and c = 0:1293. The results largely agree with those of Papageorgiou (2012). The only
dierence is that he assumed self-employed earnings to be an imputed wage.
According to the AMECO database, the debt-to-GDP ratio of Greece in 2008 was
1.13, and the average annual compound growth rate of GDP for the period 2000{2008 was
about 3.5%. Then, we set binit = 1:13. The long-run growth rate in the initial steady state
is set as init = 0:035. Using (19), (21), and G=Y = g=(Ak

g ), we choose the values of A
and  such that G0=Y0 = 0:2170, B0=Y0(= b0) = 1:13, and 

init = 0:035 hold in the initial
steady state, which yields A = 0:465 and  = 0:0412.
18The EU KLEMS database is freely accessible at http://www.euklems.net/.
19The AMECO database is freely accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/economy nance/db indicators/ameco/index en.htm.
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E Welfare Eects of b
To calculate the value of U0 , we calculate the dynamic path and initial value of Ut R1
t
e (v t)C1 v =(1  )dv using the relaxation algorithm. However, we cannot calculate
the dynamic path and initial value of Ut directly because Ut does not remain constant in
the steady state. Let us dene Xt  Ut=K1 t . Since Ct  ctKt, we have
_Xt = Xt   c
1 
t
1     (1  )(Ak

g;t   ct   gt   k)Xt:
In this case, Xt becomes constant over time in the high-growth steady state. Then, we
calculate the dynamic path and the initial value of Xt using the relaxation algorithm.
Since K0 is normalized to one, we have that U

0 = X0.
If the utility function is given by (30), as in Section 7, we further dene Xcg ;t R1
0
e t ln(Cg;t)dt  ( =) lnKt. Since Cg;t  (1  )gtKt, we have
_Xcg ;t = Xcg ;t    ln(1  )gt  
 

(Akg;t   ct   gt   k):
In this case, Xcg ;t becomes constant over time in the steady state, and we can calculate
the dynamic path and initial value of Xcg ;t. Since K0 = 1, we have that U

0 = X0+Xcg ;0
under (30).
F Debt Reduction based on Tax Increases and Expenditure Cuts
After the increase in the tax rates, the budget constraint of the government becomes
_Bt = rtBt +Gt   [(r +r)rtWt + (w +w)wt + (c +c)Ct] + Tt
= (1  r)rtBt   (~Yt + cCt  Gt)  frrt(Kt +Bt) + wwt +cCt   Ttg;
where the lump-sum transfer to the households is denoted as Tt, which we will specify
later. In addition, we have Ig;t = Gt.
In this setting, (13) is modied as
gt = g(bt; ct; kg;t) +
tAk

g;t
1 + [(1  )kg;t   ] btAk 1g;t
 ~g(bt; ct; kg;t;t); (F.1)
where g(bt; ct; kg;t) is dened as in (13) and t  frrt(Kt+Bt)+wwt+cCt Ttg=Yt
represents the direct eect of tax increases on public expenditure. If t > 0, the tax
increases mitigate the negative eect of the debt reduction on public expenditure. We
formulate Tt in such a way that t > 0 gradually diminishes and eventually disappears
as the scal consolidation progresses (i.e., bt approaches bnew). Keeping in mind that the
interest and wage rates can be rewritten as rt = Ak
 1
g;t kg;t k and wt = (1 )Ak 1g;t Kg;t,
respectively, we dene rt  Akg  1kg;t   k and wt = (1  )Akg  1Kg;t, where kg
denotes the new steady-state value of kg;t. Using these denitions, we specify Tt as
Tt = rr
(Kt +Bt) + wwt +cc
Kt; (F.2)
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where c is the new steady-state value of ct. Under (F.2), t is expressed as
t  fr + (1  )w +rAkg;tbtg
"
1 

kg;t
kg
1 #
+c

ct   c
A(kg;t)

:
When r = w = c = 0, we have t = 0. From the discussion in subsection 3.2, we
plausibly guess that, even with tax increases, debt reductions raise the steady-state value
of kg and, hence, k

g > kg;0 holds. The discussion in Subsection 3.3 reasonably suggests
that ct increases initially in response to debt reductions. Then, under (F.2), we expect
that t takes a positive value just after the policy change. As the scal consolidation
progresses, kg;t and ct converge to k

g and c
, respectively. Then, t gradually diminishes
and eventually disappears.
Equations (14) and (15) are modied as
_ct =

ct + ~g(bt; ct; kg;t;t) 

1  1

(1  r  r)

Akg;t  


+

1  1  r  r


k

ct;
(F.3)
_kg;t = ( + kg;t)~g(bt; ct; kg;t;t)  Ak1+g;t + ctkg;t + (k   g)kg;t: (F.4)
The dynamic system of the economy is given by (7), (F.3), and (F.4). As in the benchmark
model, there exists a unique steady state. Note that in the steady state, w and c
disappear from the dynamic system. As long as r = 0, the steady state in this modied
model corresponds exactly to that of the benchmark model. When r > 0, this is not
the case, because r directly inuences household behavior, and so is included in (F.3).
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Table 2: Data Averages and Solutions in the Initial Steady State
Variable Description Data averages Solution
C0=Y0 Consumption-to-output ratio 0.6985 0.6405
(K0 +Kg;0)=Y0 Total capital-to-output ratio 3.558 2.7850
TR0=Y0 Tax revenue-to-output ratio 0.3262 0.3634
Table 3: Welfare Eects ( = 0:1590)
bnew 

H;new  =0.01  =0.025  =0.05  =0.075  =0.1
0.6 0.03538 C0 0.382% 0.9% 1.65% 2.28% 2.82%
U0 0.559% 1.31% 2.38% 3.26% 4%
Cequiv 0.374% 0.883% 1.62% 2.23% 2.76%
(20.9) (8.4) (4.2) (2.8) (2.1)
0 0.03575 C0 0.819% 1.95% 3.62% 5.07% 6.34%
U0 1.19% 2.8% 5.1% 7.01% 8.63%
Cequiv 0.803% 1.91% 3.55% 4.96% 6.21%
(9.3) (3.7) (1.9) (1.2) (0.9)
The gures in parentheses are the years taken for the debt-to-GDP ratio to decrease by
10% from 1.13 to 1.03.
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Table 4: Welfare Eects with Tax Increases
bnew Revenue  =0.01  =0.025  =0.05  =0.075  =0.1
0.6 Benchmark 0.559% 1.31% 2.38% 3.26% 4%
r 1% " -7.35% -6.59% -5.52% -4.63% -3.88%
2% " -10.3% -9.56% -8.47% -7.57% -6.81%
3% " -13.6% -12.8% -11.7% -10.8% -10%
w 1% " -0.549% 0.174% 1.2% 2.04% 2.75%
2% " -0.863% -0.148% 0.861% 1.69% 2.39%
3% " -1.17% -0.467% 0.529% 1.35% 2.04%
c 1% " 0.122% 0.874% 1.95% 2.84% 3.6%
2% " 0.00149% 0.753% 1.83% 2.72% 3.49%
3% " -0.116% 0.635% 1.71% 2.61% 3.38%
Table 5: Welfare Eects: Public Services ( = 0:1590)
  =0.01  =0.025  =0.05  =0.075  =0.1
0 0.559% 1.31% 2.38% 3.26% 4%
0.1 0.692% 1.55% 2.7% 3.63% 4.39%
0.3 0.904% 1.94% 3.23% 4.21% 4.99%
0.5 1.06% 2.24% 3.63% 4.65% 5.46%
Table 6: Welfare Eects: Public Services and Tax Increases
bnew Revenue  =0.01  =0.025  =0.05  =0.075  =0.1
0.6 Benchmark 1.06% 2.24% 3.63% 4.65% 5.46%
r 1% " -6.1% -4.95% -3.57% -2.56% -1.75%
2% " -8.59% -7.43% -6.05% -5.03% -4.23%
3% " -11.3% -10.1% -8.73% -7.7% -6.89%
w 1% " 0.637% 1.76% 3.09% 4.07% 4.85%
2% " 0.505% 1.61% 2.93% 3.9% 4.66%
3% " 0.371% 1.47% 2.77% 3.72% 4.48%
c 1% " 0.885% 2.02% 3.38% 4.4% 5.2%
2% " 0.835% 1.96% 3.32% 4.32% 5.13%
3% " 0.786% 1.9% 3.25% 4.25% 5.06%
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Figure 4: Steady State When  > 0
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Figure 5: Steady State When   0
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